Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition by Ellis, Christopher J. & Dincer, Oguzhan C., 1969-
Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition
Christopher J. Ellis* and Oguzhan C. Dincer**
March 2005.
Abstract
Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the
decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon
using a model of Yardstick Competition. Further, using data on government corruption in US
states, we provide some new evidence that supports the theoretical ndings.
Keywords: Corruption, decentralization, yardstick competition
JEL classication: H20, H29.
*Corresponding Author:
Department of Economics,
University of Oregon,
Eugene, OR 97403-1202
USA.
Email: cjellis@oregon.uoregon.edu
**Department of Commerce,
Massey University,
Private Bag 102 904,
Auckland
New Zealand.
                   
Acknowledgements:
1
1 Introduction
Recent works by several contributors point to a signicant negative relationship between the degree
to which the powers to tax and spend are decentralized in an economy, and the overall level of
governmental corruption1 (Treisman 2000, de Mello 2000, de Mello and M. Barenstein 2001, Fisman
and Gatti 2002a, Arikan 2004) On the surface this is quite surprising. It might be predicted that
local politician-bureaucrats and bureaucrats posses detailed local knowledge of any opportunities
for corruption that might arise in their jurisdictions. They may thus be expected to extract any
corruption rents available more e¢ ciently than less well informed national politician-bureaucrats.
In what follows we propose both a theoretical explanation for, and nd further evidence in
support of, the observed negative empirical relationship between corruption and decentralization.
We argue that because there are more independent taxation and expenditure decisions made in
a decentralized economy, then there are more opportunities for local populations to make cross-
jurisdictional comparisons of politician-bureaucrats performances. The poor performance of a
government in one jurisdiction might be attributed to a number of factors including corruption,
but as the number of observations made by the populations of jurisdictions increases, the inferences
they make about the causes of a particular jurisdictions poor performance become increasingly
precise. This idea that the performance of local jurisdictional governments can be evaluated by
cross jurisdictional comparisons was rst proposed by Besley and Case (1995). They compared the
behaviors of state governors and found that if a particular policy was adopted by one governor,
and deemed to be successful, it was rapidly copied by his neighbors. Besley and Case concluded
that local populations were making comparative evaluations of jurisdictional governments, who
thus responded by engaging in what has come to be known as yardstick competition. The
attractiveness of this explanation for governmental behavior is that it is very parsimonious with
information; to make evaluations very little detailed knowledge is required. The population simply
compares outcomes across jurisdictions, and draws simple statistical inferences about politician-
bureaucratslevels of competence or objectives.
In our anlaysis we modify the yardstick competitionapproach and show that it can be fruitfully
applied as an explanation for the decentralization/corruption relationship. Further, we provide
additional empirical support for the predictions of the theory.
A key role of local governments is to collect taxes and supply to their constituencys goods or
services such as roads, sewers, parks, garbage collection and the like. The process by which tax
revenues are transformed into the supply of various publicly provided goods might be envisaged as
a stochastic one, where the nal supply of the good is subject to both jurisdiction speciec and
common random shocks. The failure of one jurisdiction to produce an adequate supply of goods and
services from tax revenue may be due to a poor draw from the distributions of the relevant random
variables, or, it may be due to corruption. The more observations are made across jurisdictions,
the better the inferences that may be made over the probability that poor performance was due to
corruption. If the populations in jurisdictions are able to better detect corruption either politician-
bureaucrats will refrain from this activity, or, corrupt politician-bureaucrats will more frrequently
be removed from o¢ ce. Hence the observed decentralization/corruption relationship arises.
However this immediately raises other questions, if greater decentralization reduces corruption
why not decentralize further? Where should the process stop and why? It seems likely that the
answer lies in the technology of service production. Scale economies can be realized if some goods
1One recent paper that bucks this trend is Fisman and Gatti 2002b who nds that expenditure decentralization
does not reduce the level of corruption unless it is accompanied by revenue decentralization.
2
are produced by larger jurisdictional units. Indeed scale economies are often the justication for
removing the provision of some goods and services from the private sector. Hence the loss of
productive e¢ ciency may have to be traded o¤ against the reduction in corruption. The optimal
level of decentralization then follows from equating the marginal impacts of these countervailing
e¤ects.
2 Model.
We begin with a very simple model with constant marginal costs of public service provision. The
objective here is to develop the inference problem on which our arguments are based, and establish
the basic corruption/decentralization relationship. In section 3 we introduce decreasing costs and
explore optimal decentralization.
The economy is assumed to be divided into i = 1; :::; n jurisdictions each with a population of
size mn . In each jurisdiction the local government supplies a service zi(t) = f0; 1g to every individual
in the population, and funds this provision by levying the per person tax of  i(t): The production
of the service is given by a stochastic production technology
zi(t) = f((t); "i(t)) = (t)"i(t) (1)
where "i(t) and (t) are jurisdiction specic and economy wide productivity shocks respectively.
We assume that
"i(t) =

0 with probability p
1 with probability 1  p (2)
and
(t) =

0 with probability q
1 with probability 1  q : (3)
Each jurisdiction is run by a politician-bureaucrat drawn from a local population in which fractions
i are honest and 1  i dishonest respectively. We assume that the jurisdictions are ordered such
that i  j if i > j. Each politician-bureaucrat lives for two periods and serves in each period
at the discretion of the local population. The politician-bureaucrats are paid a wage w(t) for each
period they retain o¢ ce, and can, if they choose, supplement this wage by stealing tax revenues
ri(t). politician-bureaucrats that are honest never steal, those that are dishonest do so if this raises
their expected income. The expected utility of a politician-bureaucrat in jurisdiction i is given by
Vi(t) = wi(t) + ri(t) + E[wi(t+ 1) + ri(t+ 1)]; (4)
where 0 <  < 1 is a discount rate. Initially for purposes of expositional simplicity we assume
wi(t) = wi(t+ 1) = 0, giving
Vi(t) = ri(t) + E[ri(t+ 1)]: (5)
It will soon be obvious that if a politician-bureaucrat chooses to steal they will set ri(t) =
 
m
n

 i(t)
and ri(t+ 1) =
 
m
n

 i(t+ 1); that is they will steal all tax revenues availabe to them:
The population of each jurisdiction have just one decision to make, whether to retain a politician-
bureaucrat to run the jurisdiction in the second period of the politician-bureaucrats life or replace
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them with a fresh draw from the population. We assume the population to be homogeneous with
utility functions
Ui = xi(t) + zi(t)   i(t)  i(t) + E[xi(t+ 1) + zi(t+ 1)   i(t+ 1)]; (6)
where xi(t); xi(t + 1) are the populations incomes, and i(t) is the cost of replacing a politician-
bureaucrat if this action is taken. For algebraic simplicity we henceforth assume xi(t) = xi(t+1) = 0
giving
Ui = zi(t)   i(t)  i(t) + E[zi(t+ 1)   i(t+ 1)]: (7)
We shall assume that the public cannot directly observe the random variables (t) and "i(t). All
that the pubic may observe is whether the service is supplied or not, hence they receive the signals
si(t) =

zi(t) = f0; 1g i¤ ri(t) = 0
0 otherwise.
:8i (8)
Notice that the population in jurisdiction i observe the supply of services in all other jurisdictions
sj(t)8j, and hence may make inferences based on yardstick competition. Should the population in a
particular jurisdiction decide that it is su¢ ciently likley that their local government is corrupt they
will decide to replace them with a new draw from the population of potential politician-bureaucrats.
We address this next.
2.1 Replacing politician-bureaucrats.
The politics of the economy are assumed to be quite simple. Each jurisdiction selects a politician-
bureaucrat via random draw from the pool of potential politician-bureaucrats at the start of period
1, after observing sj(t)8j, the populations in each jurisdiction decide whether to retain the incum-
bent or take a new draw. All dishonest politician-bureaucrats will steal in the second period all
honest politician-bureaucrats will not. A new draw will be made if the expected value of doing so
exceeds the expected value of retention that is if
i(1  p)(1  q)    i(t+ 1)(1  p)(1  q) (9)
or
i   
(1  p)(1  q)  i(t+ 1); (10)
where i(t + 1) is the publics posterior beliefs about the type of the politician-bureaucrat in
jurisdiction i following the observations sj(t)8j: Clearly then the decision to retain or replace a
politician-bureaucrat depends on the updating of beliefs about the politician-bureaucrats type.
2.2 Updating of Beliefs
We assume the public are Bayesians who update beliefs about a politician-bureaucrats type accord-
ing to Bayes Rule. Hence
i(t+ 1) = Pr

ih j s1(t); ::::::; sn(t)

=
Pr

s1(t); ::::::; sn(t) j ih

Pr

ih

Pr [s1(t); ::::::; sn(t)]
=
(
Pr

s1(t); ::::::; sn(t) j ih

Pr [s1(t); ::::::; sn(t)]
)
i; (11)
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where we adopt the notation Pr

ih

for Pr [i is honest] and Pr

id

for Pr [i is dishonest] :
We thus need to compute the appropriate probabilities. Three information states can arise for
any jurisdiction i. Either positive production of the service is observed in i, positive production
of the service is not observed in i but is observed in another jurisdiction, or positive production
of the service is not observed in any jurisdiction. We term these information states revealing,
partially-revealing and non-revealing respectively2 .
2.2.1 Revealing State
In the revealing state for jurisdiction i service production is observed, that is si(t) = 1; in which case
the population immediately deduce (t) = "i(t) = 1 and that the incumbent politician-bureaucrat-
bureaucrat is honest. Hence updating involves
i(t+ 1 j si(t) = 1) = Pr

ih j si(t) = 1

= 1: (12)
2.2.2 Partially-Revealing State
Here the observation is made that the service is not produced in jurisdiction i; si(t) = 0; however
elsewhere production is positive, sj(t) = 1 some j 6= i:Hence the population of jurisdiction i will
immediatly be able to deduce that for the economy wide shock (t) = 1:They will update their
beliefs concerning the honesty of their own politician-bureaucrat according to (see appendix for
details)
i(t+ 1 j si(t) = 0 \ (t) = 1) = Pr

ih j si(t) = 0 \ (t) = 1

=
pi(t)
1  (1  p)i(t) : (13)
2.2.3 Non-Revealing State
Finally it is possible that service production is not observed in any jurisdiction, si(t) = 0 8i; here
updating is quite complex and involves
i(t+ 1 j si(t) = 0 8i) = Pr

ih j si(t) = 0 8i

=
 
Pr

si(t) = 0 8i j ih

Pr [si(t) = 0 8i]
!
i(t): (14)
With a little manipulation (see appendix) this can shown to be equal to
i(t+ 1 j si(t) = 0 8i) =
 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
i(t): (15)
2The modeling strategy of choosing a multilicative stochastic production technology comprising of {0,1} shocks
was precisely to give this simple three state information structure. This specication can be generalized without
qualitatively e¤ecting the conslusions that follow, but the cost in terms of algebra is quite large.
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In the case of homogeneous jurisdictions, j(t) = i(t)8i; j; reduces to
i(t+ 1 j si(t) = 0 8i) =
 
[1  (t)(1  p)]n 1 p(1  q) + q
[1  (t)(1  p)]n (1  q) + q
!
i(t): (16)
It is not too di¢ cult to show that
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  i(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
! 1 as n!1 (17)
hence i(t + 1 j si(t) = 0 8i) ! i(t) from below as n ! 1. As the number of jurisdictions in
which si(t) = 0 8i is observed increases, the probability that this is because (t) = 0 approaches 1,
so the observation contains no useful information on i:
Expressions (12), (13), and (15) now describe how the beliefs of the population in jurisdiction i
about the honesty of their politician-bureaucrat evolve in each of the the three possible information
states. These together with the expected frequency with which the three information states will
occur allows us to study the expected level of corruption in an economy and its relationship to
decentralization.
2.3 Decentralization and the Level of Corruption.
In this two period model, we know that dishonest politician-bureaucrat will engage in corruption
in the rst period. Hence the level of expected total corruption in the rst period is simply
E [C(t)] = (1  p) (1  q)
nX
i=1
m
n

(1  i(t)) : (18)
This is the sum over all the jurisdictions of the probabilities that positive production is realized
then is appropriated by a corrupt politician-bureaucrat.
In the second period after observing si(t) 8i each jurisdictions population updates their beliefs
of their own politician-bureaucrats type. Those for whom
i(t)  
(1  p)(1  q)  i(t+ 1) (19)
holds, will choose to separate and take a new draw from the local population of potential politician-
bureaucrats. Since separations only take place if the populations (correctly) believe that taking
a new draw from the distribution of potential politician-bureaucrats will reduce the frequency of
corruption it follows that if we can show that an increase in the number of jurisdictions increases
the frequency of separations then it also decreases the frequency of corruption.
Proposition 1 The expected level of corruption in the second period is non-increasing in the level
of decentralization provided that politician-bureaucrats are not red when zero service production is
observed in all jurisdictions. In the case where politician-bureaucrats are red when zero service
production is observed in all jurisdictions then the expected level of second period corruption is
non-increasing in the level of decentralization for "almost all" levels of decentralization.
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Proof. Appendix.
As discussed above there are three possible information states that can arrise, and for each in-
formation state the population in a jurisdiction i will update their beliefs appropriately using Bayes
rule. In determining the relationship between the expected level of corruption and decentralization
we need to analyze both the e¤ects of a change in the number of jurisdictions, n; on the updating
process in each information state, and its e¤ect on the frequency of each information state occuring.
To provide intuitive insight into the proposition we take these three information states in turn.
1. In the revealing information state.a politician-bureaucrat is seen to be honest si(t) = 1; here
clearly the level of decentralization cannot e¤ect the level of expected corruption in i, as there
is none. Further the probability that this state will arrise is independent of the number of
other observations made n:
2. In the partially-revealing information state, the public in jurisdiction i know that there is a
positive economy wide shock, since they observe no service production in their own jurisdic-
tion, they can only attribute this to an adverse local shock or a corrupt politician-bureaucrat
and thus will reduce the probabiity they attribute to the politician-bureaucrat in i being hon-
est. Hence, provided condition (10), is met a separation will occur. While the updating of
i(t) is independent of n, the probability that this information state will occur and hence that
this update occurs is increasing in n:That is, as the number of jurisdiictions becomes large,
it becomes quite unlikely that every jurisdiction will either be run by a corrupt politician-
bureaucrat and/or draw a zero jurisdiction specic productivity shock. Hence the liklihood of
the partially-revealing information state occuring is increasing in n, therefore the likelihood
of a separation occuring is increasing in n, ergo expected corruption is decreasing in n:
3. In the non-revealing information state an increase in n increases the probability the population
in i attach to their politician-bureaucrat being honest. However, the liklihood that this
information state will arrise is decreasing in n; giving an ambiguous e¤ect of decentralization
on expected corruption.
The rst part of the proposition tells us that if direct cross-jurisdictional comparisons are re-
quired for politician-bureaucracts to experience separation, that is if they occur only in the partially-
revealing information state, then corruption is non-decereasing in decentralization. Here the only
impediment to obtaining the stronger result of corruption strictly decreasing in the level of decen-
tralization is the discreteness of the problem. The second part of the proposition is required because
of a "knife edge" property of the analysis. There is a level of decentralization n at which the public
in a jurisdiction i are just indi¤erent between separation from a politician-bureaucrat in both the
partially-revealing and non-revealing information states, and separation in the partially-revealing
information state only. At n expected corruption can (but is not guaranteed to) discontinuously
increase in decentralization (see the appendix).
3 Optimal Decentralization and Corruption.
One natural assumption is that the service is provided by the local government because it is subject
to decreasing costs, and hence if supplied by the private sector would be a natural monopoly. If we
assume that the cost of producing of a unit of the service is increasing in the number of jurisdictions
then there can be a trade o¤ between corruption and production e¢ ciency and hence an optimal
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level of decentralization. For the purposes of analyzing this issue we shall assume all jurisdictions
are identical. Suppose now that the tax cost per person of providing each with zi(t) = f0; 1g units
of the service is such that
 i(t; n) =
n
N
: (20)
Then the marginal increment to per person taxes as a consequence of adding a jurisdiction is
4 i = 1
N
8i; n: (21)
Where 4 is the one step ahead di¤erence operator and N is a constant.
The expected marginal increment to per person service supply is given by
i(t)(1  p)(1  q)4

1   nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)]
= i(t)(1  p)(1  q) [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)] (1  q)
h
[1  j(t)(1  p)]n   [1  j(t)(1  p)]n+1
i
= i(t)(1  p)(1  q) [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)] (1  q) [j(t)(1  p)] [1  j(t)(1  p)]n (22)
The rst term in this expression i(t)(1 p)(1  q) is the expected service in the partially-revealing
information state; the second term [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)] (1 q) [j(t)(1  p)] [1  j(t)(1  p)]n is
the increment to the probability that this information state will occur as the number of jurisdictions
increases by one. It follows that the optimal level of decentralization n# satises
i(t)(1  p)(1  q) [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)] (1  q) [j(t)(1  p)] [1  j(t)(1  p)]n
#  1
N
> i(t)(1  p)(1  q) [1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)] (1  q) [j(t)(1  p)] [1  j(t)(1  p)]n
#+1 (23)
clearly there exist parameterizations of the model for which an 0 < n# <1 exists.
4 Proximity.
Our analysis can be reinterpreted to give insight into the relationship between proximity and cor-
ruption. Consider the economy to be divided into informationally separate islands. Suppose that
each island consists of n jurisdictions each of which shares the common productivity shock (t):
These common shocks are uncorrelated across informational islands. The smaller are such islands,
that is the smaller is n; the more proximate they are in an informational sense. We know from our
previous analysis that expected corruption is decreasing in n, it follows immediately that proximity
and corruption are positively related. Smaller islands are morel likely to experience corruption in
any jurisdiction hence the correlation of corruption across nearby jurisdictions.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide some empirical evidence that supports the theoretical relationship between
decentralization and corruption derived above. Although several cross-country studies such as de
Mello and Barenstein (2001), and Fisman and Gatti (2002a) nd a negative relationship between
decentralization and corruption, our empirical analysis advances the existing literature in a couple
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of di¤erent ways. First, we avoid comparing di¤erent countries by examining cross-state corruption
in the United States. Data on corruption, decentralization, and on such control variables as public
sector wages across states are more comparable than those across countries. Second, we employ a
5-year panel of corruption to control for unobserved state characteristics.
5.1 Data
As our measure of corruption we use data from the Justice Departments "Report to Congress on
the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section." The report provides information on
the number of federal, state, and local public o¢ cials convicted for crimes related to corruption
by state. Since there are lags between the time of crime and the time of conviction, we use 5-year
averages for the period 1987-2001 for the 48 contagious U.S. states. Following Fisman and Gatti
(2002b) we deate the data on convictions by state population. We measure decentralization as the
share of non-central government expenditure in total government expenditure, which is equal to
total expenditure of local government divided by the total expenditure by all levels of government
(state and local). This is one of the most widely used measures of decentralization in the literature.
We use data from U.S Census Bureaus "Government Finances" for the years 1991, 1996, and 2001.
We include a number of control variables in our empirical analysis to minimize omitted variable
bias. According to Fisman and Gatti (2002b) less developed states are likely to be more corrupt.
Hence to control for the level of development across states we include 5-year averages of the level of
real per capita gross state product. For the level of real per capita gross state product we use data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and for population we use data from the U.S Census Bureau.
Following Glaeser and Saks (2004) we also control for ethnic fractionalization. As Glaeser and Saks
(2004) argue ethnic fractionalization is likely to increase corruption by decreasing the popular will
to oppose corruption. We use data from the U.S Census Bureaus "Census 2000" to calculate the
ethnic fractionalization index; dened as 1 P s2i , where si is population share of group i. Following
"Census 2000" the ethnic categories included in the calculation of the ethnic fractionalization index
are Hispanic, White, Black, Asian, American Indian and Eskimo, Hawaiian and Pacic Islander and
Others. Finally, we control for government wages deated by per capita gross state product. Low
government wages are likely to provide an incentive for government o¢ cials to engage in corruption.
Goel and Rich (1989) and van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) nd a negative relationship between
the level of government wages and the level of corruption. We use data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for the years 1991, 1996, and 2001. The summary statistics for all variables are given in
Table 1.
Table 1:Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N
Corruption 0.313 0.187 0.000 0.865 144
Decentralization 0.519 0.079 0.323 0.654 144
Neighbor Corruption 0.306 0.107 0.053 0.653 144
GSP (in 000) 27.086 5.153 17.216 43.071 144
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.354 0.155 0.068 0.661 144
Government Wage 1.250 0.110 0.956 1.486 144
Population (in 000000) 5.525 5.908 0.457 34.607 144
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5.2 Results
Our empirical specication is as follows:
Corruptionst = 0 + 1Decentralizationst + 2Neighbor Corruptionst + 3Xst + it (24)
where Corruptionst represents the corruption in state s during year t , Neighbor Corruptionst
represents the average corruption in the neighboring states,.Decentralizationst represents decen-
tralization, Xst represents the set of other state characteristics that a¤ect corruption (government
wages Government Wagest, per capita gross state product GSPst, ethnic fractionalization Ethnic
Fractionalizationst, and population Populationst) and it represents the error term.
Table 2: Pooled OLS and RE Estimates
Pooled OLS Random E¤ects
Constant
1.128
(0.396)
0.802
(0.397)
Decentralization
-0.623
(0.202)
-0.516
(0.291)
Neighbor Corruption
-0.451
(0.147)
0.344
(0.144)
GSP
-0.012
(0.004)
0.009
(0.004)
Ethnic Fractionalization
0.375
(0.133)
0.308
(0.179)
Government Wage
-0.375
(0.191)
-0.161
(0.213)
Population
0.007
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
N 144 144
R2 0.22
Dependent Variable: Corruption
*, **, and *** denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The results of the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation are given in the rst column
of Table 1. The estimated coe¢ cient of Decentralizationst is negative and highly signicant,
indicating that higher decentralization reduces the level of corruption. The estimated coe¢ cient of
Neighbor Corruptionst deserves particular attention. None of the cross country studies examine
the e¤ects of corruption in neighboring countries. Fisman and Gatti (2002b) uses corruption in
the neighboring states in their cross-state study as a control variable, but their results are not
statistically signicant. The estimated coe¤cicient of Neighbor Corruptionst in the Pooled OLS
Estimation is positive and highly signicant indicating the presence of "yardstick competition".
In other words, the level of corruption in a state decreases as it decreases in the neighboring
states. As far as the estimated coe¢ cients of the control variables are concerned, all of them
are highly signicant and have the expected signs. Parallel to the existing literature, estimated
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coe¢ cients of GSPst and Government Wagest are negative and the estimated coe¢ cients of Ethnic
Fractionalizationst and Populationst are positive.
The second column of Table 1 gives the results of the Random E¤ects (RE) Estimation3 . Al-
though the estimated coe¢ cients of some of the control variables such as Government Wagest and
Populationst lose their signicance, the other control variables are highly signicant, and the esti-
mated coe¢ cients of all of the control variables have the expected signs. The estimated coe¢ cients
of Decentralizationst and Neighbor Corruptionst, are both highly signicant have the expected
signs.
5.3 Robustness of the Results
The main robustness issue is whether the results are due to endogeneity. Corrupt governments are
likely to oppose scal decentralization as it decreases their ability to steal. Following Arikan (2004),
to correct for possible endogeneity, we instrument for decentralization with the surface area of the
state in square miles. A good instrument is a variable that is supposed to be uncorrelated with
the error term but correlated with the endogenous variable Decentralizationst. As Arikan (2004)
argues the surface area is not likely to explain the level of corruption and it is a variable that is
often used as an explanatory variable for decentralization.
Table 3: 2SLS and 2SRE Estimates
Pooled OLS Random E¤ects
Constant
2.377
(1.102)
1.553
(0.948)
Decentralization
-2.161
(1.286)
-1.999
(1.478)
Neighbor Corruption
0.354
(0.182)
0.273
(0.159)
GSP
-0.018
(0.006)
0.013
(0.007)
Ethnic Fractionalization
0.624
(0.248)
0.481
(0.293)
Government Wage
-0.693
(0.329)
-0.143
(0.251)
Population
0.016
(0.008)
0.014
(0.009)
N 144 144
Dependent Variable: Corruption
*, **, and *** denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The results of the 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation are given in the rst column of
Table 2. Although the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient of Decentralizationst is bigger, it
remains negative and highly signicant. However, estimated coe¢ cient of Decentralizationst loses
its signicance when it is estimated by 2 Stage Random E¤ects (2SRE). Nevertheless, it too is
negative. The results of the 2SRE Estimation are given in the second column of Table 2. The
3Hausman Test suggests Random E¤ects Estimation.
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estimated coe¢ cient of Neighbor Corruptionst is positive and highly signicant in both the 2SLS
and 2SRE estimations. The magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient, on the other hand, is smaller.
As far as the estimated coe¢ cients of the control variables are concerned, Government Wagest
and Populationst lose their signicance when they are estimated by 2SRE. All of the estimated
coe¢ cients of the control variables are highly signicant and have the expected signs when they are
estimated by 2SLS.
6 Conclusion
We present a model which uses the yardstick competition approach proposed by Besley and Case
(1995) to explain the negative relationship between decentralization and corruption. The model
demonstrates that as the population in a jurisdiction make observations across jurisdictions, the level
of corruption is decreasing in decentralization. It the public service is supplied under conditions of
decreasing costs, then we are able to dene.in optimal level of decentralization, and hence an optimal
level of corruption. Further, the model can easily be reinterpreted to predict that jurisdictions close
together will tend to experience similar levels of corruption. The empirical evidence that we provide
supports the results that come out of the model. Using data for the Unites States, for the period
1987-2001, we nd the level of corruption in a state is negatively related with decentralization and
positively related to the level of corruption in the neighboring states.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of (13)
We have
i(t+ 1) = Pr

ih j si(t) = 0 \ (t) = 1

since
Pr

ih j si(t) = 0 \ (t) = 1

Pr [si(t) = 0 j (t) = 1] Pr [(t) = 1]
= Pr

si(t) = 0 j ih \ (t) = 1

Pr

ih j (t) = 1Pr [(t) = 1]
it follows that
i(t+ 1) = Pr

ih j si(t) = 0 \ (t) = 1

=
Pr

si(t) = 0 j ih \ (t) = 1

Pr

ih j (t) = 1
Pr [si(t) = 0 j (t) = 1]
=
pi(t)
1  (1  p)i(t)
7.2 Derivation of (15).
We have
i(t+ 1) = Pr

ih j sj(t) = 0 8j

=
 
Pr

sj(t) = 0 8j j ih

Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j]
!
i(t);
so
Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j] = Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j j (t) = 1] Pr [(t) = 1] + Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j j (t) = 0] Pr [(t) = 0]
= Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j j (t) = 1] (1  q) + q
and
Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j j (t) = 1] = nj=1 [Pr ["j = 1 \  j = 1] + Pr ["j = 0]]
= nj=1 [Pr [ j = 1 j "j = 1]Pr ["j = 1] + Pr ["j = 0]]
= nj=1 [(1  j(t))(1  p) + p)]
So
Pr [sj(t) = 0 8j] = nj=1 [(1  j(t))(1  p) + p] (1  q) + q
also
Pr

sj(t) = 0 8j j ih

= Pr

sj(t) = 0 8j j (t) = 1 \ ih

Pr [(t) = 1] + Pr [(t) = 0]
= nj 6=i [Pr [ j = 1 j "j = 1]Pr ["j = 1] + Pr ["j = 0]] Pr ["i = 0]Pr [(t) = 1] + Pr [(t) = 0]
= nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
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So nally
i(t+ 1) =
 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
i(t)
If j(t) = i(t)8i; j then
i(t+ 1) =
 
[1  j(t)(1  p)]n 1 p(1  q) + q
[1  j(t)(1  p)]n (1  q) + q
!
i(t)
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove this proposition we begin with a couple of simple lemmas
Lemma 2 The frequencies at which the three information states arise are given by
1. Pr[si(t) = 1] = (1  p)(1  q)i(t)
1. Pr[si(t) = 0\sj(t) = 1 some j] =
h
1 

nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
i
[1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)]
2. Pr[si(t) = 08i] =

nj=1;j 6=i

1  j(t)(1  p)

(1  q) + q

[1  (1  p)(1  q)i(t)]
Lemma 3 No separation occurs in jurisdiction i if the information state si(t) = 1 occurs, nor is
the frequency of this information state e¤ected by the level of decentralization.
Proof. Follows immediately from si(t) = 1 which reveals the politician-bureaucrat/bureaucrat i is
honest:
Lemma 4 If for a given set of parameter values a separation occurs in jurisdiction i for the infor-
mation set si(t) = 08i then it also occurs for the information set si(t) = 0 \ sj(t) = 1 some j:But
the converse is not true.
Proof. Involves demonstrating 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
>

p
1  (1  p)i(t)

)  nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q (1  (1  p)i(t)) > p  nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
) nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q (1  (1  p)i(t)) > nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + pq
) q (1  (1  p)i(t)) > pq
) 1 > p
as required.
Lemma 5 The frequency with which the information state si(t) = 0 \ sj(t) = 1 some j occurs is
equal to one minus the frequency with which the information state si(t) = 08i occurs. Hence the
e¤ects of an increase in decentralization on the frequency that information state si(t) = 0\sj(t) = 1
some j occurs is equal to minus its e¤ect on the frequency with which the information state si(t) =
08i occurs.
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Proof. By denition Pr[si(t) = 0 \ sj(t) = 1 some j] = 1   Pr[si(t) = 08i] and the proof is
immediate.
Proof of the Proposition: We now know there are three possibilities
1. No separation in jurisdiction i - hence 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
i(t) >

p
1  (1  p)i(t)

i(t) > i  
(1  p)(1  q)
here n clearly has no e¤ect on corruption.
2. Separation in jurisdiction i only in the information state si(t) = 0 \ sj(t) = 1 some j - hence 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
i(t) > i  
(1  p)(1  q) >

p
1  (1  p)i(t)

i(t)
so an increase in n has no e¤ect on corruption within either the information state si(t) =
0 \ sj(t) = 1 some j or within the information state si(t) = 08i, but it increases the relative
frequency with which information state si(t) = 0\ sj(t) = 1 some j arrises. Since separations
occur only in this information state it follows that the frequency of separations increases and
hence expected corruption falls as decentralization increases.
3. Separation in jurisdiction i occurs in both information states si(t) = 0\ sj(t) = 1 some j and
si(t) = 08i : - hence
i  
(1  p)(1  q) >
 
nj 6=i [1  j(t)(1  p)] p(1  q) + q
nj=1 [1  j(t)(1  p)] (1  q) + q
!
i(t) >

p
1  (1  p)i(t)

i(t)
here since separations occur in both information states n does not e¤ect the frequency of sepa-
rations and hence decentralization does not e¤ect corruption.
To demonstrate the caveat in the proposition we note that
nj 6=i[1 j(t)(1 p)]p(1 q)+q
nj=1[1 j(t)(1 p)](1 q)+q is in-
creasing in n hence there is an n at which there is a ip from case 3 to case 2. This can lead
to a drop in expected separations if the e¤ect of moving between the two cases outweighs the
e¤ect on the probability of the two information states occuring.
15
References
Arikan, Gulsun G. (2004). "Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?" International
Tax and Public Finance 11: 175-195.
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995). "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting, and
Yardstick Competition." American Economic Review 85: 25-45
Fisman Raymond and Roberta Gatti (2002a). "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence
Across Countries." Journal of Public Economics 83: 325-345.
Fisman Raymond and Roberta Gatti (2002b). "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence
from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs." Public Choice 113: 25-35.
Glaeser, Edward L. Rave E. Saks (2004). "Corruption in America." NBER Working Paper
10821.
Goel, Rajeev K. and Daniel P. Rich (1989). "On the Economic Incentives for Taking Bribes."
Public Choice 61: 269-275.
de Mello, Luiz (2000). "Can Fiscal Decentralization Strengthen Social Capital?" IMF Working
Paper WP/00/129.
de Mello Luiz and Matias Barenstein (2001). "Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A Cross
Country Analysis." IMF Working Paper WP/01/71.
Treisman, Daniel (2000). "Decentralization and the Quality of Government." Mimeo.
van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Beatrice Weder (2001). "Bueaucratic Corruption and te Rate
of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service A¤ect Corruption, and by How Much?" Journal of
Development Economics 65: 307-331.
16
